In November 2019, Matt Gaetz led a group of Republican congressmen to storm the SCIF (Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility), a space designed specifically to store classified information and securely discuss confidential issues. The reasoning—to stop the “kangaroo court” impeachment investigations into Donald Trump’s conduct (DiMaurio & Pehme, 2020).
Did this in any way stop the investigations from moving forward? No. Did it accomplish any substantive policy goals? No. Did the videos from forbidden cellphones egregiously violate national security? Potentially. But it did make for an excellent TV spot for ringleader Gaetz and his cohorts to tweet to their inflamed followers as they “bum-rushed” the guarding officers to enter the proceedings (DiMaurio & Pehme, 2020). Suddenly January 6th seems less a mystery.
Mayhew views legislators as “single-minded seekers of re-election,” driven by ambition above all else (Carson & Jenkins, 2011). Assuming this thesis holds true, it would appear the motives of the politicians would be to best appeal to their constituency. The typical American voter, however, often isn’t educated about the nuances of each policy question. With the nationalization of the elections, frequently the “R” or “D” next to a candidate’s name is the most salient issue at hand.
This perpetual campaign has made fundraising vitally important, turning many into “glorified telemarketers” in constant search of cash (DiMaurio & Pehme, 2020). Congressional government committees—the Judiciary Committee, the Appropriations Committee, the Ethics Committee, etc.—used to be filled by qualified individuals. Today one must pay to play—a committee chair is expected to raise between $600,000 to $1.8 million per cycle, while leadership like Speaker Nancy Pelosi or Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy are expected to raise between $50 million to $80 million (DiMaurio & Pehme, 2020). Expertise is not nearly as valuable as acting as a party’s cash cow.
Autonomy is also central to Mayhew’s thesis regarding the electoral connection—politicians must be the masters of their own fate, operating with independence (Carson & Jenkins, 2011). But with special interest groups and lobbyists frequently holding the pocketbook, is the only path to re-election pandering to these factions?
As of late 2020, 60 members of Congress operated free of corporate PACs, a movement becoming increasingly popular (DiMaurio & Pehme, 2020). Democrat Katie Hill openly ran a campaign based on small-dollar donations rather than PAC money, but she was quickly pushed out of Congress due to personal scandal (DiMaurio & Pehme, 2020). Comprehensive bills like HR1 might shift accountability from these moneyed shadow groups into voters’ hands. Yet, despite interest expressed by members of both parties, these policies fail, and the status quo is maintained.
In 2010, the Koch brothers essentially made climate change a poison pill, “signal[ing] that any Republican who acknowledged [it] would be taken out—they would be primaried” (DiMaurio & Pehme, 2020). Yet a June 2020 Pew Research Poll shows that two-thirds of Americans think that the government should be doing more to combat climate change (Tyson & Kennedy, 2020). There is bipartisan support for several climate policies, with 64 percent of Republicans supporting tougher restrictions on power plant emissions and 52 percent supporting stricter fuel-efficiency standards for cars (Tyson & Kennedy, 2020). But these policies cannot get anywhere as long as they are held hostage by special interests.
Mayhew contends that members of Congress must be responsive to their constituents through “advertising, credit claiming, and position taking” (Carson & Jenkins, 2011). The challenge is that to reach these constituents successfully, politicians may be beholden to the policy interests of their corporate donors, creating a conundrum. How does an official position themselves on an issue that may benefit their constituency but harm their bottom line?
Because the Republicans are handicapped by large-dollar donors on the issue of climate change, the Democrats are the electorate’s preferred party on environmental issues, with a 2018 poll showing a 32-point advantage (Pew Research Center, 2018). Conversely, in 2018, Republicans held an 11-point lead on dealing with terrorist threats and a 9-point lead on the economy (Pew Research Center, 2018). This issue ownership, a parties’ “perceived competence in handling issues and problems,” can ebb and flow based on a number of short-term performance issues—like economic downturn—or long-term constituency changes causing the party to shift viewpoints (Stubager & Slothuus, 2012).
Mayhew tells us that politicians are incentivized to perform due to accountability—voters may choose to reward or punish them at the ballot box (Carson & Jenkins, 2011). From 2018 to 2021, after Democrats gained the majority in both the White House and Congress, voter perception of party performance changed drastically. Republicans have gained ground on several issues—favored today by 9 points on immigration (jumping to a staggering 27 points when framed as “border security”), 18 points on the economy (rising to 24 when asked specifically about inflation), and 22 points on both crime and national security (Murray & Kamisar, 2021). If these opinions hold, the Democrats may experience accountability firsthand through the 2022 midterm elections.
But with Supreme Court rulings like Citizens United v. FEC (2010)—which afforded significantly more influence to corporations—and Rucho v. Common Cause (2019)—which refused to quash partisan gerrymandering—who are the politicians accountable to today? Unlimited dark money pours into elections. Candidates choose their voters rather than voters choosing them.
Professor Lessig of Harvard contends that we have “broken the core institution of our democracy […] and at a certain point winning elections in a broken system doesn’t get you anything” (DiMaurio & Pehme, 2020). “Everybody is so obsessed in deciding what we should do,” he argues, “as if we can do something” (DiMaurio & Pehme, 2020).
Perhaps there was an underlying truth to Trump’s calls to “Drain the Swamp,” even if his lack of follow-through proved him disingenuous. Washington D.C. has become the capital of corruption—the den of double-dealing. The system is collapsing under the weight of special interests and greed, but do the electorate even know? The Great and Powerful Oz has spoken, Dorothy. Pay no attention to that man behind the curtain.
References
Carson, J. L., & Jenkins, J. A. (2011). Examining the electoral connection across time. Annual Review of Political Science, 14, 22-46. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-030310-221852
DiMaurio, D., & Pehme, M. (Directors). (2020). The swamp [Film]. HBO Documentary Films.
Pew Research Center. (2018, June 20). Voters more focused on control of congress – and the president – than in past midterms.
Stubager, R, & Slothuus, R. (2012). What are the sources of political parties’ issue ownership? Testing four explanations at the individual level. Political Behavior, 35(2), 567-588. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-012-9204-2
Todd, C., Murray, M., & Kamisar, B. (2021, November 1). The political environment looks like 2014, and that’s scary news for democrats. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/meet-the-press/political-environment-looks-2014-s-scary-news-democrats-n1282847#anchor-GOPmakesgainsonkeyissues
Tyson, K., & Kennedy, B. (2020, June 23). Two-thirds of Americans think government should do more on climate. https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2020/06/23/two-thirds-of-americans-think-government-should-do-more-on-climate/
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