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Dirty Politics: Has Trump-Era Negativity Brought Us Off the Deep End?

  • withlovekait
  • Nov 22, 2021
  • 4 min read

A 2016 Pew Research Center poll found that 92 percent of American voters felt that the 2016 election had “more mudslinging than usual”—a startling leap from the 54 percent in 2008 and 68 percent in 2012. Geer (2006) argues that not only has negativity remained relatively consistent over the years, constituting about one-third of presidential appeals, but that “attack advertising can enrich the information environment available to citizens” (p. 135-136).


Voters typically vote either prospectively—focusing on visions of the future—or retrospectively—holding incumbents responsible for past actions (Geer, 2006, p. 154). Because the American public as a whole is typically “uninformed and unengaged,” retrospective voting is a more straightforward approach (Shaw, 2006, p. 21). It is much easier to assign blame for shifting economic and political circumstances than to educate oneself about often complicated and messy policy proposals. A challenger’s negative ads are “five times more likely to be retrospective than prospective,” as often making the campaign a referendum on their opponent is to their benefit (Geer, 2006, p. 156).


Often a campaign’s outcome can be predicted based on the fundamentals, which are “in place before the campaign begins,” with the campaign itself acting as “a mere conduit to drive the voters’ decision to its deterministic decision” (Erickson & Wlezien, 2012, p. 2). These fundamentals can be internal—affected by the issues or ideologies a person or group finds personally salient—or external—predicated on outward conditions such as the economy or unemployment numbers (Erickson & Wlezien, 2012, p. 6). Typically, incumbents can win based solely on these external factors, with an economic growth rate of over 1.5 percent frequently resulting in reelection (Shaw, 2006, p. 22).


Imagine a world in which the world’s economy and health had not been ravaged by the coronavirus pandemic. These outside factors were a massive hit to Trump’s reelection campaign, as they gave the Democrats excellent fodder for negative retrospective analysis. Though unknowable if the Democrats would have had any more success combating COVID-19, the party could easily point to the current administration’s failings. The fundamentals of 2020 heavily favored the out-party in this scenario.


Through enlightenment—“taking positions, emphasizing positions, and challenging each other”—the Democrats could create significant distinctions between Trump’s position on the virus and Biden’s (Erickson & Wlezien, 2012, p. 8). They could then prime the voter to place the most emphasis on this issue.


Given the chaos of the year prior, Republicans primed the voters to focus their attention in an entirely different direction. Portraying participants in the Black Lives Matter protests as thuggish rioters and looters, they assaulted the Democrats for not “backing the blue” and fomenting violence. Law and order was their key message, running attack ads showing the frail blue-haired elderly woman calling an empty 911 dispatch office as a hooded man breaks her window—nobody will come to save you if the Democrats get their way.


But does all this campaigning even have an effect? Shaw (2006) tells us that those with “middle-level awareness might be susceptible to [these] information flows” (p. 21). While hyper-partisans and the totally disengaged either stand firm or remain indifferent, these middle voters have the potential to be persuaded by politicians, though fairly minimally—with the net movement perhaps as low as 2 to 3 percentage points (Shaw, 2006, p. 30). While voters may “flirt with candidates from the other party,” by election day, the majority “return to their partisan roots” (Shaw, 2006, p. 148-162).


Millions of dollars spent, multiple presidential debates, insults hurled back and forth—yet only a minuscule 2 to 3 percent movement? One theory is that campaigns aren’t necessarily useless—there is an ability to shift voters’ opinions—rather, the “effects of the competing Democratic and Republican campaigns cancel out” (Erickson & Wlezien, 2012, p.6). All this animosity and vitriol for what feels like a zero-sum game.


Geer (2006) contends that “if a group is inattentive, it may take some yelling to get their attention,” and the American voter is nothing if not inattentive (p. 159). He argues that “we need these heated exchanges” to become educated about the relevant political issues and hold parties accountable (Geer, 2006, p. 159). But with increased polarization and plummeting voter faith, is there a limit to the utility of all this negativity?


Are the candidates still constrained, as Geer theorized, by “what evidence will support” lest their “attacks fall flat and become counterproductive” (Geer, 2006, p. 152)? Or has Trump eliminated that prerequisite? By not only attacking a party, but instead calling into question the integrity of our democratic elections with scant proof, has he crossed some invisible line in the sand?


Perhaps negativity is essential to our democracy, but there is danger in letting “negativity reach its maximum point—all attacks and no positive appeals” (Geer, 2006, p. 153). The electorate needs vigorous debate to distinguish between candidates, but not at the total loss of policy discussions and progress. One of the candidates will hold office in the end, and if their only claim to it is their opponent’s innate wickedness, they’ve proved nothing more than the lesser of two evils.


References

Erickson, R. S., & Wlezien C. (2012). The timeline of presidential elections: How campaigns do (and do not) matter. University of Chicago Press.

Geer, J. G. (2006). In defense of negativity: Attack ads in presidential campaigns. University of Chicago Press.

Pew Research Center (2016, November 21). Low marks for major players in the 2016 election—including the winner. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2016/11/21/voters-evaluations-of-the-campaign/

Shaw, D. R. (2006). The race to 270: The electoral college and the campaign strategies of 2000 and 2004. University of Chicago Press.

 
 
 

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