In the last decade, culture wars have been steadily on the rise. From vagina hats to the transgender bathroom bill—from debates arising on critical race theory to the published works of Dr. Seuss—the chasm between left and right has never felt so wide. Is this great divide—caused by clashes of class, religion, and gender—past any sensible rectification?
Despite women gaining the right to vote over a hundred years ago, it wasn’t until 1980 that they began casting votes at a rate equal to that of men. With Reagan on the ballot, this was the first year that a significant gender gap began to appear—with 55 percent of men voting for the Republican candidate while only 47 percent of women gave him their vote—a gap that would only grow over time as women began to favor Democratic candidates more heavily (Thomson-DeVeaux & Conroy, 2020).
As the “Grand Old Party” held fast to more traditional norms, they also took a “sharp right turn on issues that mattered to women,” such as the Equal Rights Amendment and the social safety net programs (Thomson-DeVeaux & Conroy, 2020). Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, women had experienced a sexual liberation of sorts through access to birth control and abortion through Roe v. Wade. They were no longer relegated to the role of housewife, rather they could seek fulfillment through work—they could buck convention.
The 2020 election saw a slight shift in the voting pattern, with the gender gap from 2016 to 2020 shrinking from 13 points to 7 points—Trump improved his performance with female voters, while Biden saw a marked increase in male support (Skelley, 2021). While identifying the exact reason for this is complicated, a variety of factors likely came into play. Perhaps latent sexism affected male voters when Hillary Clinton was on the ballot in 2016, but polls also point to the “influence that educational attainment has on vote choice” (Skelley, 2021). College-educated voters—both male and female—were more likely to cast their ballot for Biden in 2020 than for Trump (Skelley, 2021).
A college education is just one of the indicators of socioeconomic status, which is determined by “a bundle of individual characteristics centered around income, education, and occupation” (Manza & Crowley, 2018, p. 369). A number of social scientists have postulated a “death of class” (Manza & Crowley, 2018, p. 367), in that the socioeconomic status of individuals no longer holds much influence over their policy positions.
Another assertion is that while class attitudes still may be significant, our country may be undergoing a realignment of class concerning voting behaviors. “White working-class voters, increasingly influenced by the conservative framing of electoral contests around social issues […] have been encouraged to overlook (or misunderstand) their own economic interests” (Manza & Crowley, 2018, p. 376). Reacting to elite cues regarding more cultural issues, voters of lower socioeconomic status don’t necessarily cast votes to their benefit.
As these social issues--abortion, gay marriage, gun control, transgender rights—have come to the forefront, the family values language espoused by the religious right has built a sizeable voting coalition. Margolis and Campbell posit that in today’s politically polarized society, politics is now driving individuals’ religious views rather than the other way around (Niskanen Center, 2019).
Margolis discusses how a person’s religiosity typically “wax[es] and wan[es]” over time—perhaps attending a parent’s church in youth but distancing oneself from organized religion as they become more independent in their young adult years (Niskanen Center, 2019). Often as Republicans get married and begin to have children, they return to their childhood churches. Conversely, Democrats—particularly white, as predominately Black churches do not have the same conservative tilt—may experience an “allergic reaction” to the conservative ideals espoused by the church and its association with the religious right and begin to move towards secularization (Niskanen Center, 2019).
As the Democratic party becomes increasingly secularized and embraces progressive beliefs, the Republican party continues to hold fast to the country’s more conservative founding principles. Pastor Matt Chandler of the Village Church argues that “the more [the Democratic party] presses, the more it makes the conservatives dig in their heels” (Vice News, 2020). With such entrenchment on the left and right, finding a solid middle ground seems far-fetched. Are two political parties with vastly different views regarding gender roles, religion, and class inequality capable of bridging this divide?
References
Manza, J, & Crowley, N. (2018). Class divisions and political attitudes in the 21st century. In D. Albarracín, & B. T. Johnson (Eds.), The handbook of attitudes, volume 2: Applications (pp. 367-397). Routledge.
Niskanen Center. (2018, November 8). How Americans’ politics drives their religious views [Podcast Transcript]. Retrieved from https://www.niskanencenter.org/how-americans-politics-drives-their-religious-views/
Skelley, G. (2021, July 9). Why the gender gap may have shrunk in the 2020 election. FiveThirtyEight. https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-the-gender-gap-may-have-shrunk-in-the-2020-election/
Thomson-DeVeaux, A., & Conroy M. (2020, August 19). Women won the right to vote 100 years ago. They didn’t start voting differently from men until 1980. FiveThirtyEight. https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/women-won-the-right-to-vote-100-years-ago-they-didnt-start-voting-differently-from-men-until-1980/
Vice News. (2020, January 8). The evangelical divide over religion in politics [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5qWT_ok_17o
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