Hell, Even 10 is a Stretch.
Republicans are conservative. Democrats are liberal. In 2021, these are not controversial statements to make. This delineation between the two parties seems straightforward today, but the past paints a much murkier picture.
1972 was the first year that the ANES asked self-identified Republicans and Democrats about their ideological leanings, and the result was fairly modest (Abramowitz, 2019, p. 27). But by 1988, ideology was significantly tied with party, particularly among white voters. Liberal whites’ favor of the Democratic party shifted by 18 points, and there was a mass exodus of conservative whites to the Republicans by 28 points (Abramowitz, 2019, p. 41). By 2012, only 6 percent of Democrats identified as conservative, and 1 percent of liberals identified as Republican (Abramowitz, 2019, p. 52).
From the Great Depression to the COVID era, the population that makes up these coalitions has dramatically altered. The issues on the forefront of American minds nearly one-hundred years ago look nothing like today’s issues. From Civil Rights to Roe v. Wade (1973)—from FDR to Reagan to Obama—the parties have broken apart and remade themselves.
Under Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the New Deal coalition formed—made up of white southerners, northern white ethnics, the northern white working class, and African Americans—though racist policies such as poll taxes and literacy tests often kept the last of this group from the voting booth (Abramowitz, 2019, pp. 19-25). Despite the disparate experiences of these groups, they were united by their economic suffering during the Great Depression. Roosevelt’s New Deal gave them a chance to pull themselves out of poverty into the middle class.
Before the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the perception of welfare was that it boosted the worthy white citizens’ opportunities. As Blacks’ ability to participate in the national conversation increased, Republicans weaponized the idea that these same social safety net programs of prior decades might now be given to “the undeserving poor.” In the 1980s, Reagan invoked the concept of economic slavery—the country would be “creating a permanent culture of poverty as inescapable as any chain or bond” (McGhee, 2021, p. 33).
Even today’s pernicious GOP stereotype of “welfare queen” often invokes racially-tinged language of the boogey(wo)man who steals your hard-earned tax-dollars—all the while driving a Cadillac and eating fancy lobster dinners. Unsurprisingly, the nonwhite share of the Republican vote was a mere 10 percent in 2012 (Abramowitz, 2019, p. 48).
The 1950s saw almost negligible gender, marriage, and religiosity gaps—though the issues of abortion and gay rights had yet to present themselves (Abramowitz, 2019, pp. 26-27). The younger generations of the 1960s began to embrace free love, hippies, and drugs—followed in the 1970s by the landmark Supreme Court decision legalizing abortion. Now with an opt-out for the consequences of premarital sex and the ability for women to more freely leave the kitchen for the workplace, the status quo was at risk. Religious conservatives formed organizations like the Moral Majority to push back on this new secularization threatening their “traditional family values” (Abramowitz, 2019, p. 53).
Both parties have embraced these wedge issues, such as abortion and same-sex marriage, to draw a cultural distinction between the two parties. Starting with Reagan, Republicans have “aggressively courted” these religious voters, “seeing an opportunity to win over a large bloc” (Abramowitz, 2019, p. 53). In turn, Democrats have taken the progressive stance on these cultural disputes to appeal to the young and college-educated voters, along with women and LGTBQ voters.
Even as both parties formed their coalitions around economic and cultural issues, it wasn’t until 1994 that Newt Gingrich developed a successful strategy to nationalize elections (Abramowitz, 2019, p. 46). Prior to this unification of party message, Democratic candidates were often able to regionalize issues and win both the House and Senate even with a failed presidential bid (Abramowitz, 2019, pp. 29-33). Ticket-splitting was more common, and the advantage of incumbency led 99 percent of House Democrats to win reelection even as George H.W. Bush went on to his second term (Abramowitz, 2019, p. 37).
Though Gingrich’s strategy successfully led to less party defection and increased straight-ticket voting, it arguably contributed to today’s polarization. While in 1976, only 37 percent polled gave the opposition party a negative rating, by Obama’s 2012 election, that number leapt to 70 percent (Abramowitz, 2019, p. 60). Party loyalty may have been shored up, but disdain is also on the rise.
The contentious election of 2020 may have at least temporarily halted this consistent straight-ticket voting. As Biden handily won in many areas, the down-ballot ticket proved that his coattails were not as long as the Democrats had hoped, with “Republicans gaining 179 state legislative seats and at least 11 seats in the House of Representatives” (Edsall, 2020). Only time will tell if this was a Trump-factor anomaly or a reemergence of ticket-splitting, but the Democratic party’s coalition is clearly fragile.
Trying to balance the progressive wings of the party while still appealing to more centrist swing voters may prove to be the ultimate balancing act. From 2016 to 2020, Democrats continued to “hemorrhage votes in low-income, low-education counties,” typically their base, while gaining with those with higher incomes and education levels (Edsall, 2020). In the 1980s, Republicans won 76 of the 100 counties with the largest share of college degrees—by 2020, Democrats won 84 of these (Edsall, 2020).
Trump has led the Republican party to take on vastly different priorities. Once the party of fiscal conservatism and limited government, Trump has “hijacked the party” for the deep state and conspiracy theories (Scherer & Dawsey, 2021). Through “populist anger” and a “zest for cultural battles,” he has refocused the party on grievance, with little regard for the rising national debt (Scherer & Dawsey, 2021). This party’s goalposts bear little resemblance to those held by the party of Reagan from the 1980s.
So how does one appeal to the moderate suburban voter? The voter who doesn’t support the rallying cry “Defund the Police”? The voter who doesn’t believe that the capitol rioters were made up of fine patriots taking a peaceful stroll through the building?
Are the Republican and Democratic coalitions crumbling before our eyes? Or are they simply remaking themselves as they have time and time again?
References
Abramowitz, A.I. (2019). The great alignment: Race, party transformation, and the rise of Donald Trump. Yale University Press.
Edsall, T. B. (2020, December 2). Honestly, this was a weird election. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/02/opinion/biden-trump-moderates-progressives.html
McGhee, H. (2021). The sum of us: What racism costs everyone and how we can prosper together. One World.
Scherer M., & Dawsey, J. (2021, May 23). Republicans struggle to define a new governing coalition as Trump closes grip on party. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/republicans-struggle-to-define-a-new-governing-coalition-as-trump-closes-grip-on-party/2021/05/23/07bce926-b98a-11eb-96b9-e949d5397de9_story.html
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